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ABSTRACT 
Safety applications of Vehicular Ad hoc Network (VANET) demand delay 
intolerant and are vulnerable to attacks due to the mobility of nodes and wireless nature 
of their communications. These applications require an integrated security mechanism, 
which provides message integrity, anonymity, non-repudiation, revocation, 
availability, and location authentication services. This mechanism should provide 
acceptable message delay with or without dependency to Road Side Units (RSUs). 
Realizing the importance of VANET security, two mechanisms are proposed and 
evaluated in this research. The mechanisms are aimed at fulfilling the VANET security 
requirements for safety applications with acceptable message delay. Two new 
lightweight security mechanisms, RSU-Aided Anonymous Authentication (RAAA) 
and Group Signature-based Anonymous Authentication (GSAA) have been proposed. 
These mechanisms are based on Group Signature (GS) and Pseudonym Public Key 
Infrastructure (PPKI). GS scheme was applied to ensure anonymity, non-repudiation 
and revocation, whereas PPKI was applied to achieve authentication and message 
integrity. Additionally, a novel function for location verification was proposed to 
guarantee availability and location authentication. Simulations were performed using 
NS2 to verify and evaluate the efficiency of the mechanisms for urban and highway 
scenarios with various traffic conditions. Simulation results showed that RAAA and 
GSAA outperformed Group Signature and Identity-based Signature (GSIS), and 
Short-Term Linkable Group Signatures with Categorized Batch Verification 
(STLGSCBV). In comparison to GSIS and STLGSCBV, the results indicated 
improvements of at least 5.26% and 7.95% in terms of vehicle density impact on 
message delay, and at least 11.65% and 11.22% in the case of vehicle density impact 
on message loss ratio. Furthermore, the simulated RAAA and GSAA methods resulted 
in approximately 11.09% and 10.71% improvement in message delay during signature 
verification in comparison to GSIS and STLGSCBV. Additionally, RAAA and GSAA 
proved to achieve at least 13.44% enhancement by considering signature verification 
on message loss ratio in comparison to GSIS and 7.59% in comparison to STLGSCBV. 
The simulation results also demonstrated that less than 20ms message delay was 
achieved by RAAA and GSAA mechanisms in the case of less than 90 vehicles within 
the communication range. This is an acceptable message delay and hence, the proposed 
mechanisms have a great potential to be used in safety critical applications. 
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ABSTRAK 
Aplikasi Keselamatan Rangkaian Ad hoc Kenderaan (VANET) menuntut tiada 
toleransi kepada masa lengah dan mudah terdedah kepada serangan kerana mobiliti 
nod dan sifat komunikasi tanpa wayar mereka. Aplikasi ini memerlukan satu 
mekanisme keselamatan bersepadu yang menyediakan integriti mesej, 
ketanpanamaan, tanpa sangkalan, pembatalan, kebolehsediaan dan perkhidmatan 
pengesahan lokasi. Mekanisme ini perlu menyediakan masa lengah mesej sewajarnya 
dengan atau tanpa pergantungan kepada Unit Tepian Jalan (RSU). Menyedari tentang 
kepentingan keselamatan VANET, dua mekanisme telah dicadangkan dan dinilai 
dalam kajian ini. Mekanisme ini bertujuan untuk memenuhi keperluan keselamatan 
VANET untuk aplikasi keselamatan dengan masa lengah mesej yang boleh diterima. 
Dua mekanisme keselamatan ringan yang baharu iaitu Pengesahan Awanama 
Berbantukan RSU (RAAA) dan Pengesahan Awanama Berasaskan Tandatangan 
Kumpulan (GSAA) telah dicadangkan. Mekanisme ini berasaskan Tandatangan 
Kumpulan (GS) dan Tandatangan Digital Lengkung Eliptik (PPKI). Skema GS telah 
diaplikasi untuk memastikan ketanpanamaan, tanpa sangkalan dan pembatalan, 
manakala PPKI telah digunakan untuk mencapai pengesahan dan integriti mesej. 
Selain itu, fungsi baharu pengesahan lokasi telah dicadangkan untuk menjamin 
kebolehsediaan dan pengesahan lokasi. Simulasi telah dilaksanakan menggunakan 
NS2 untuk mengesah dan menilai kecekapan mekanisme yang dicadangkan dalam 
senario bandar dan lebuh raya dengan pelbagai keadaan lalu lintas. Keputusan simulasi 
menunjukkan bahawa RAAA dan GSAA mengatasi Tandatangan Kumpulan dan 
Tandatangan Berasaskan Integriti (GSIS), dan Tandatangan Kumpulan Pautan Jangka 
Pendek dengan Pengesahan Berkelompok Berkategori (STLGSCBV). Berbanding 
dengan GSIS dan STLGSCBV, keputusan menunjukkan peningkatan sekurang-
kurangnya 5.26% dan 7.95% dari segi kesan kepadatan kenderaan kepada masa lengah 
mesej dan sekurang-kurangnya 11.65% dan 11.22% dalam kes kesan kepadatan 
kenderaan kepada kadar kehilangan mesej. Tambahan pula, simulasi kaedah RAAA 
dan GSAA menunjukkan lebih kurang 11.09% dan 10.71% penambahbaikan untuk 
masa lengah mesej semasa pengesahan tandatangan berbanding dengan GSIS dan 
STLGSCBV. Selain itu, RAAA dan GSAA terbukti mencapai sekurang-kurangnya 
13.44% peningkatan dengan mengambil kira pengesahan tanda tangan pada nisbah 
kehilangan mesej berbanding dengan GSIS dan 7.59% berbanding dengan 
STLGSCBV. Keputusan simulasi juga menunjukkan kurang daripada 20ms mesej 
kelewatan telah dicapai oleh mekanisme RAAA dan GSAA untuk kes kurang daripada 
90 kenderaan dalam julat komunikasi. Ini merupakan satu masa lengah mesej yang 
boleh diterima dan menunjukkan mekanisme mempunyai potensi yang besar untuk 
digunakan dalam aplikasi keselamatan kritikal. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Overview 
Vehicular ad-hoc network (VANET) is referred to co-operation of vehicles, with 
or without Road Side Units (RSUs), over the specific short-range communication to 
distribute information. This recent technological innovation provides a more secure 
and comfortable transportation by offering solutions for road safety, transportation 
efficiency and passenger entertainments (ETSI, 2009; Baldessari et al., 2007). 
Road safety is a life and death issue. Based on U.S. Department of 
Transportation statistic report, transportation contributes to almost one-third of the 
accidental deaths of young people in the United States (USDOT, 2013). Typically, 
over 1.2 million people die in road accidents around the globe annually. In addition to 
that, every year between 20 to 50 million people experience non-fatal accidents which 
some leads to lifelong disabilities (WHO, 2009).  
For above mentioned reasons, enhancing driving safety and traffic efficiency are 
the main reasons for utilizing the potential of the VANET through its Vehicle to RSU 
(V2R or R2V) and Vehicle to Vehicle (V2V) communication (Zeadally et al., 2012; 
ETSI, 2009; Hartenstein and Laberteaux, 2008; Baldessari et al., 2007). 
2 
VANET communications utilize Dedicated Short-Range Communications 
(DSRC) channel allocated in 5.9 GHz band (Kenney, 2011). Wireless Access in 
Vehicular Environments (WAVE) architecture explains the necessary architecture and 
services for VANET devices (IEEE-1609.0, 2014). The WAVE protocol stacks are 
included in IEEE 802.11 and IEEE 1609 standards where for physical (PHY) and 
Medium Access Control (MAC) layers, the IEEE 802.11 standard (IEEE-802.11, 
2012) is adopted for VANET communication. 
VANET applications are classified as road safety, traffic efficiency, and 
infotainment (Karagiannis et al., 2011; ETSI, 2009). Safety applications attempt to 
improve road safety by providing information of roads and vehicles to predict and 
prevent collisions. Safety applications are involved with life circumstances of 
vehicles’ passengers. Which make them time sensitive, and requires high levels of 
message integrity. These types of applications usually communicate in a local area 
range of few kilometres or hops (Hartenstein and Laberteaux, 2009; Olariu and 
Weigle, 2009). 
For making VANET more trustable for users, transmitted data by VANET needs 
to be authenticated. However, an authenticated message might be used to trace vehicle 
owners via VANET. Therefore, an authentication mechanism, which protects users’ 
privacy, is crucial (Emara et al., 2015; Fan et al., 2012). On the other hand, safety 
applications requirements have a significant role in VANET security and need to be 
taken into serious consideration. It is of most importance that security mechanisms of 
safety applications meet the specific performance conditions which without 
considering them, they might be unsuitable for VANET (Lin and Lu, 2015; Kavitha 
and Tangade, 2013; Papadimitratos et al., 2008; ploessl and Federrath, 2008). Based 
on the literature review on VANET, the most important security services utilized by 
safety applications are message integrity, anonymity, non-repudiation, revocation, 
availability, and location authentication. 
3 
1.2 Background of Problem 
Due to mobility of nodes and wireless nature of communication, VANET’s 
security is vulnerable and it could be an inviting target of many attacks. Attacks against 
VANET might be dangerous for drivers and passengers, as false message or delay on 
sending message could lead to an accident. Therefore, transferring information through 
VANET needs to have authentication and message integrity security services. Since 
communication can lead to vehicles’ tracking, authentication and integrity without 
protecting user privacy is insufficient. Anonymity is a very common approach to 
protect privacy of individuals and can be provided in communication systems by 
pseudonyms. VANET pseudonym authentication mechanisms are classified as 
symmetric and asymmetric mechanisms (Lin and Lu, 2015; Petit et al., 2015; Al-
Sultan et al., 2014). 
Comparing symmetric cryptography with asymmetric cryptography, the former 
is more efficient in computation and communication overhead. In symmetric schemes, 
access to the secret key for signing or verification of the message should be restricted 
as, any node can generate valid signature while it has the secret key. Thus, a node’s 
anonymity extends to all nodes with the same secret key. However, symmetric 
cryptography cannot provide the non-repudiation characteristic as the main feature for 
accountability of drivers’ actions (Yang, 2013). Hence, the use of asymmetric 
cryptography seems to be a more suitable approach for providing security of VANET 
safety applications. 
Asymmetric VANET pseudonym authentication methods are categorized into 
three classes, namely Pseudonym Public Key Infrastructure (PPKI), Identity Based 
(IB), and Group Signature Based (GSB) schemes. In PPKI scheme, a set of 
public/private keys with certificates issued by Certificate Authority (CA) are used for 
anonymous authentication. However, due to the vast number of vehicles on the road, 
the CA certificate database could become huge. As a result, retrieving information of 
a malicious vehicle becomes time-consuming for authorized authority. Therefore, this 
4 
authentication scheme might fail in taking the scalability as well as resulting in 
communication overhead (Yang, 2013; Xue and Ding, 2012). In order to overcome 
these issues, the majority of new PPKI schemes concentrate on providing appropriate 
approaches for issuing as well as changing vehicle's pseudonyms. 
Armknecht et al. (2007) proposed a mechanism to issue pseudonyms for 
vehicles. They suggested vehicles produce the pseudonyms and then CA certified 
them. Their mechanism utilizes bilinear pairing as well as zero-knowledge proofs to 
generate pseudonym. In this method, for revoking a key, the CA publishes updated 
system parameters, which prevents the revoked vehicles to update their master key. 
Unfortunately, this mechanism suffers from communication overhead. 
In another study, Calandriello et al. (2007) proposed a hybrid mechanism which 
is a combination of  traditional PPKI and group signature scheme. Here, each vehicle 
holds one common group public key as well as an individual group private key. 
Vehicle generates a set of public/ private keys and certifies them accordingly by using 
its own group private key to use them as pseudonyms in communication. This 
mechanism solves some issues of the PPKI mechanisms; however, it has insufficient 
pseudonym update. In addition, this mechanism is vulnerable against tunnelling and 
Sybil attacks, therefore, it cannot provide availability services as an important 
requirement needed by safety applications. 
One of the other hybrid PPKI mechanisms is the Studer et al. (2009) approach. 
They use group signature mechanism between pseudonymous provider and vehicles 
to securely transfer limited certified pseudonym to vehicles. Subsequently, vehicles 
use these pseudonyms in traditional PPKI mechanism to sign their messages. 
However, using the Studer et al. (2009) mechanism, when the number of revoked 
members increased, the pseudonym generation time will increase dramatically. In 
addition, this mechanism has insufficient key update. The other drawback of this 
method is that vehicles are required to obtain a new pseudonym in every 2 to 3 minutes, 
which could consequently result in communication overhead. 
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In overall, Armknecht et al. (2007) , Calandriello et al. (2007), and Studer et al. 
(2009) approaches are able to provide message integrity, anonymous authentication, 
non-repudiation, and revocation security services without requiring RSUs. However, 
location authentication is not provided by these mechanisms and they are vulnerable 
against Sybil attack. 
On the other hand, Petit et al. (2015) indicated that one of the most important 
parameter of pseudonym usage is the changing rate. Indeed, it affects the 
communication, computation, and storage overhead along with the level of privacy. In 
the past decade, several pseudonym change methods have been proposed. Eckhoff et 
al. (2010) suggested a strategy in which, each vehicle keeps a set of pseudonyms 
(called pseudonym pool) and also changes its pseudonym at certain time slots rather 
than storing a huge amount of pseudonyms. However, tracking still becomes trivial 
while the attacker is able to recognise the period of pseudonym change. For addressing 
this issue, Yuanyuan et al. (2011) suggested that vehicles change their pseudonym 
randomly. Therefore, an adversary cannot predict the next pseudonym change. 
Nevertheless, tracking remains possible in which, just one or few vehicle change 
pseudonyms at the same time, since all other neighbours would continue using the 
same identity. Finally, it should be mentioned that both of these mechanisms 
encountering lack of location authentication. 
The second type of asymmetric VANET pseudonym authentication is IB 
schemes which use vehicle identifier as vehicles public key to act as pseudonym. When 
a vehicle asked for pseudonym, the Trusted Authority (TA) extracts a private key from 
the vehicle’s identifier (vehicle pseudonym public key) and sends it back to the 
vehicle. Similar to PPKI schemes, vehicles request new pseudonyms occasionally to 
protect user’s privacy. In order to achieve location authentication services, Park et al. 
(2011) proposed an RSU based IB mechanism which was an attempt to overcome the 
trade-off between location privacy and location assurance. They defined a hierarchical 
road location base identifier system where CA provides the location based vehicle 
identifier and a corresponding private key for each vehicle. These private keys and 
identifiers are used to sign and verify messages. However, even though this mechanism 
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can provide message integrity, anonymous authentication, and location authentication, 
it does not provide any solution for non-repudiation and revocation services.  
In another study, Dijiang et al. (2011) suggested an IB mechanism named as 
Pseudonymous Authentication-based Conditional Privacy (PACP). This mechanism 
consists of two-steps. Firstly, vehicles preloaded a ticket from the main TA, which can 
act as long-term pseudonym. Secondly, Vehicles utilize these tickets to obtain 
restricted tokens from RSUs without revealing vehicles identity. Subsequently, 
vehicles use these tokens to communicate with each other, anonymously. Each RSU 
produces maps between tickets and its corresponding tokens. In the revocation phase, 
the TA benefits from RSUs cooperation to recognise the vehicle’s identity. 
Unfortunately, this mechanism does not provide location authentication.  
The third type of asymmetric VANET pseudonym authentication is GSB 
schemes, which makes it possible for a group of vehicles to generate a signature 
anonymously inside their group. In this method, two messages signed by the same 
vehicle are not linkable together, so group signature can protect user privacy. In this 
approach, Group Manager (GM) forms the group and it is responsible to issue or 
change group’s parameter as well as group’s public key. In the GSB mechanism, the 
CA is not involved in the creation of pseudonym or revocation list. Nevertheless, the 
main disadvantages of the GSB mechanisms is high computational cost of message 
signing and verifying compared to PPKI mechanisms where it can be even higher when 
the quantity of revoked members rise up (Armknecht et al., 2007; Lin et al., 2007; 
Zeng, 2006). 
Lin et al. (2007) proposed a mechanism named Group Signature and Identity-
based Signature (GSIS). This was the very first research that encounters with the 
security problems and conditional privacy in VANETs via a cryptographic approach. 
They presented two security mechanisms for V2V and V2R communication. In the 
former mechanism, group signature is employed to secure the vehicles 
communications. In the later feature, by using ID-based cryptography a signature 
scheme is implemented in the RSUs to digitally sign every message released by the 
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RSUs and guarantee its authenticity, in which the signature overhead may seriously be 
declined. They assumed that the roadside is densely covered with a number of RSUs; 
this assumption cannot be applied easily. In addition, they assumed that the CA serves 
as group manager and is responsible to extract the ID of the signature’s originator. This 
assumption causes revocation overhead on the CA. The Lin et al. (2007) approach is 
the first GSB mechanism on VANET and many researchers followed their work (Lo 
and Tsai, 2016; Bayat et al., 2015; Ganan et al., 2015; Kumar et al., 2015; Li et al., 
2015; Chen et al., 2014). Therefore, comparing a mechanism with Lin et al. (2007) 
approach formed an evaluation platform which could indicate the level of 
improvement achieved by any new mechanism.  
An RSU-based distributed key management was recommended by Min-Ho et al. 
(2011), where a part of the group key management is devoted to RSUs. An RSU 
manages vehicles’ keys and deals with pseudonym revocation. The CA only controls 
the group public key and membership changes. Thereby, this mechanism can reduce 
the communication and computation overhead corresponded to the CA. Nevertheless, 
this mechanism suffers from insufficient revocation. In order to reduce revocation 
overhead, Sun et al. (2012) established an effectively distributed key management 
scheme in which the entire domain of VANET is divided into several sub-regions, and 
each vehicle needs to obtain its group secret key regularly from the regional group 
manager. This mechanism has the potential to decrease the revocation cost. Here, it 
should be noted that both of these mechanisms strongly require RSU. In addition, they 
are capable to provide message integrity, anonymous authentication, non-repudiation, 
and revocation. However, they do not provide any solution for location authentication 
and availability and since in these mechanisms verification is time consuming, they 
are not appropriate for VANET safety application. 
For solving message delay problem in GSB mechanism, Malina et al. (2013) 
proposed a batch verification technique, which allow the receivers to verify a group of 
messages in a glance. This mechanism is capable to provide message integrity, 
anonymous authentication, non-repudiation, and revocation security services. It has 
acceptable message delay for safety application. However, if there are some malicious 
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node broadcasting unauthorized message in the network, its performance decreases 
dramatically and the message delay increase drastically. Therefore, this mechanism is 
not suitable for securing VANET safety applications. However, with regard to 
message delay, this approach is one of the best mechanisms among all PPKI, IB, and 
GSB mechanism and worthy for comparison. 
1.3 Problem Statement 
One of the main challenges in developing VANET is providing suitable and 
integrated security mechanism, which has the potential to provide security 
requirements in terms of security services and computation as well as communication 
overhead for VANET safety applications. The majority of proposed VANET 
anonymous authentication mechanisms attempt to provide the main important security 
services i.e. message integrity, anonymity, non-repudiation, and revocation. However, 
they suffer from the lack of location authentication and availability as two main 
security services required for VANET safety applications. In addition, most of the 
stated VANET security mechanisms are lacking acceptable message delay, which is 
required by VANET safety critical applications. Moreover, most of the stated VANET 
security mechanisms are RSUs dependent; however, assuming the road with full RSU 
coverage is a bit unrealistic. 
Therefore, an integrated security mechanism for VANET safety applications 
with acceptable message delay (less than 20 ms) with or without dependency on RSU 
is required (Olariu and Weigle, 2009). In this regard, this study is an attempt to 
overcome some of these security challenges for VANET safety applications. 
Accordingly, the following research question will be answered:  
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i. How to achieve acceptable message delay where providing
authentication and message integrity for VANET safety applications
with and without dependency on RSU?
ii. How to improve message delay in providing anonymity, non-
repudiation, and revocation security services for VANET safety
applications with and without dependency on RSU?
iii. How to provide location authentication and availability security services
with acceptable message delay for VANET safety application with and
without dependency on RSU?
iv. How to evaluate and analyse the performance of proposed mechanism in
terms of message delay in different VANET scenarios?
1.4 Purpose of Study 
The aim of this research is to design and develop suitable and integrated security 
mechanisms for VANET safety applications with acceptable message delay and high 
potential in providing message integrity, anonymity, non-repudiation, revocation, 
availability, and location authentication. The proposed mechanisms in this study are 
named as RSU-Aided Anonymous Authentication (RAAA) and Group Signature-
based Anonymous Authentication (GSAA). The former mechanism is utilized for fully 
covered RSU areas, while the later mechanism is designed for the areas without RSU 
coverage. Finally, the performance of proposed mechanisms in terms of average 
message delay and average message loss ratio versus number of vehicles within 
communication range and group signature verification delay are evaluated and 
thoroughly analysed. 
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1.5 Objectives 
The objectives of this research could be defined as: 
i. To design and develop a hybrid RSU-aided anonymous authentication
mechanism based on Group Signature (GS) and Pseudonym Public Key
Infrastructure (PPKI) with location verification for VANET safety
applications to improve message delay.
ii. To design and develop a hybrid non RSU-aided anonymous
authentication mechanism based on Group Signature (GS) and
Pseudonym Public Key Infrastructure (PPKI) with location verification
for VANET safety applications to improve message delay.
iii. To evaluate and analyse the performance of the proposed mechanisms
in highway and urban scenarios.
1.6 Scope of study 
The scopes of this study are as follows: 
i. Public key of the CA are preloaded on all vehicles.
ii. Each vehicle has an individual Electronic License Plate (ELP) decided
by car producers. Every ELP is connected with a cryptographic long-
term key pair and cryptographic short-term certified key pair to act as
the pseudonym for message authentication.
iii. Revocation of Hardware Security Module (HSM) is out of the scope of
this study.
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iv. Security and privacy services below the application layer are not
considered.
1.7 Significance of the Study 
Attacks against VANET is dangerous for drivers and passengers and even delay 
on sending safety messages could lead to an accident. This research provides two 
enhanced anonymous authentication mechanisms for VANET safety applications that 
covers all security services needed by these applications. Furthermore, by providing 
location investigation procedure, these mechanisms can guarantee location 
authentication and availability services, which result in protecting the system against 
Sybil attack. The performance analysis of this research shows that, it can be a suitable 
candidate to provide security for VANET safety applications. 
1.8 Summary and Organization of the Thesis 
This chapter provides a brief introduction on the vehicular ad-hoc network along 
with defining the objectives of this project, which is followed by the significant of this 
research. 
In Chapter 2, literature review and the research background of VANET 
applications’ security accompanied with the available solutions as proposed by other 
researchers are summarized. In addition, the communication patterns and current 
existing standards for VANET are discussed. 
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Chapter 3 clarifies the methodology used in this research. All the solutions 
related to VANET security, are covered and discussed throughout this chapter. This 
includes the simulations' test-bed that is used to evaluate and validate the proposed 
algorithms. 
In Chapter 4, the design and development of an RSU aided anonymous 
authentication mechanism for VANET safety applications are discussed. Furthermore, 
this chapter presents the result of the proposed mechanism’s simulation in NS2. In 
addition, to evaluate the proposed method, the comparisons of the obtained results with 
similar works are provided. 
In Chapter 5, the design and development of an anonymous authentication 
mechanism for VANET safety application without dependency on RSU are discussed. 
In addition, the simulation of the proposed mechanism in NS2 is presented and 
evaluated by comparison with similar mechanisms. 
In Chapter 6, these research findings are concluded and some recommendations 
for future works are presented. 
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